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J11RAENKEI, V. 'rRESCONY [48 C.2d 
such award may institute proceedings ... for the purpose of 
determining an apportionment of liability or right of contri-
bution." (Italics added.) In addition, as noted, it is only 
upon a showing that those employers who have not contributed 
to payment of the original award are "without the commis-
sion's jurisdiction, or are dead, insolvent, or not subject 
to enforcement of awards against them for such contribu-
tions,'' that the right of reimbursement from the Fund arises. 
As pointed out by the Fund, this showing would necessitate 
proof which might not be available until it had been first 
drtermined whether a particular employer or insurance com-
pany was or was not actually able to satisfy the award; i.e., 
attempted enforcement of an award might well be a reason-
able element of such a showing. 
ReRpondent commission urges, however, that petitioner has 
not shown that the results would have been any more favor-
able to it if the contribution award against it had been issned 
in proceedings separate from those in which the employe's 
award was made. However, where the statutory provisions 
giving rise to a right of contribution also provide the pro-
eedure to be followed, it is fundamental that the commil'lsion 
should conform to the legislative directive. 
For the rC'asons stated the contribution award against peti-
tioner is annulled and the matter is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with the views herein expresRed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
[8. F. No. 19670. In Bank. Apr. 19, 1957.] 
CARL 1VL :B'RAENKEf1, Appellant, v. ,J. G. TRESCONY, 
Respondent. 
[1] Licenses-Exemptions.-For a construction to be "incidental 
to farming" within the meaning of the exemption of the Con-
tractors' License Law (Bus. & Prof. Code,§ 7049), the construc-
tion must be locatPd on a farm and must bP incidt>ntal to the 
farnwr's own farming- opPrations. 
[ 1] Ree Cal.Jur.2d, 
McK. Dig. References: 
Phrast>s. 
UHC<O<>~<c;-,. § 37. 
'Vnrds and 
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[2] Words and Phrases--·"Farm. 
as a tract of land used for 
defined 
one dPvoh'd to 111· 
dustry. 
[3] Licenses-Exemptions.--\Vhile present-day farming may en-
compass the u~e of multiple scattered tJ·arts rather than a 
parcel of land, still a structure "lo~atPd on a farm" 
would rrasonahly Pnvisage location on land devotrd to agri-
eulture as commonly understood to mean on land used for the 
raising of crops or pasture or both rather than location on 
property sitnated in a predominantly industrial or commercial 
sector of a town some miles from the actual farm on which 
the crops are produced. 
[ 4] Id.-Exemptions.-'U'rom the mere fact that a grain elevator is 
designed primarily for the storage of a farmer's own farm 
products, it does not automatically follow that it is thereby 
"located on a farm"; it is only if the elevator was built on 
defendant's farm and designed to function as an incidental 
part of his own farming operations that there would be a 
factual basis for holding it to be within the exemption of the 
Contractors' License Law as a "construction or operation 
incidental to ... farming." 
[5] Id.-Exemptions.-To permit the farming exemption of the 
Contractors' License Law to apply to construction work which 
is not performed on a farm would run counter to the purposes 
of such law enacted for the safety and protection of the 
public respecting structural improvements to real property 
wheTein special skill, training and ability are required. 
[61 Id.-Exemptions.-In exempting construction "incidental to 
farming" from the state licensing requirements, the Legisla-
ture did not intend to include every structure bearing a possible 
J'('lation to the farming industry and without regard for its 
location in relation to the farm, and the exemption should not 
be extended to office buildings, warehouses, grain elevators or 
similar structures constructed at sites far removed from the 
farm and perhaps in the center of cities or towns, though such 
facilities might be constructed for the sole use of a single 
farmer in connection with his own extensive farming op-
erations. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Conrt of the 
City and County of San Francisco. ·william T. Sweigrrt, 
,J ndge. Affirmed. 
Action to recover balance due for the constrnetion of a grain 
elevatm·. Judgment for defendant affirnwd. 
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Carroll F'. Jacoby and Jack Flinn for Appellant. 
John vV. Hutton for Respondent. 
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiff sought to recover the unpaid balance 
allegedly due from defendant for the construction of a grain 
elevator. Upon the ground that plaintiff failed to allege that 
he was a licensed contractor (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031), 
defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint was sustained 
without leave to amend. Plaintiff appealed and the judgment 
was reversed in order to afford plaintiff the opportunity to 
amend his complaint to show that the construction work was 
"incidental ... to farming" so as to avoid the state licensing 
requirement. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7049; Fraenkel v. Tres-
cony, 40 Cal.2d 905 [256 P.2d 573].) Plaintiff thereupon 
amended his complaint and the case was tried upon the single 
issue of whether the farming exemption applied. The trial 
court found that it did not and therefore plaintiff's failure 
to comply with the contractor's license law precluded his 
recovery. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 7026, 7028, 7031.) From 
the adverse judgment accordingly entered, plaintiff now 
appeals. 
[1] At the trial the court and both parties treated the 
holding in Fraenkel v. Bank of America, 40 Cal.2d 845 [256 
P.2d 569], a companion case on the first appeal, as stating 
the governing principle: "that the construction must be 
located on a farm and must be incidental to the farmer's own 
farming operations in order to be 'incidental to farming,' 
within the meaning of the exemption." (P. 849.) Consistent 
with this interpretation of the statutory language, the trial 
court's judgment, based upon its determination that the con-
struction in question did not qualify under the farming exemp-
tion, must be affirmed. 
Plaintiff, a licensed mechanical engineer, and defendant 
entered into a written contract calling for plaintiff's construc-
tion of a grain elevator on a "cost plus ten per cent" basis. 
The elevator was built on property owned by defendant in the 
town of San Lucas. It was located on Main Street amidst 
business buildings and homes on town lots and adjacent to the 
Southern Pacific main line tracks. Nearby there were also 
commercially operated grain sheds and storage bins owned 
by another individual. The site for defendant's grain ele-
vator was approximately 31j2 miles from defendant's farm and 
its only access therefrom was by public road. 
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The trial court found that the grain elevator was ''not con-
structed on a farm, either actually or constructively"; that 
it "was designed with the intent that it would be usable pri-
marily for the defendant's own produce, but also for the stor-
age of the grain of others on a rental basis''; and that such 
structure was ''incidental to both farming and commercial 
operation by the defendant.'' In line with these findings that 
the grain elevator was not located on a farm and was to be 
used to some extent for commercial purposes, the court con-
cluded that the statutory farming exemption was of no avail 
to plaintiff and, in the admitted absence of the required con-
tractor's license, plaintiff could not recover. 
Plaintiff contends that the evidence does not support the 
above findings except that portion declaring that the primary 
purpose of the grain elevator was for the storage of defend-
ant's own produce. In this regard, he cites these undisputed 
facts: that the size of the grain elevator, 1,000-ton capacity, 
was determined from the acreage and past harvests of defend-
ant; that any excess storage space would be available for rent 
to others only in the event defendant should have a "short 
season"; that in actual use the first year's storage consisted 
of 800 tons of defendant's own grain and 200 tons on rental, 
and in the next year's storage the respective amounts were 
700 tons of defendant's own grain and 300 tons on rental; that 
defendant did not have a warehouseman's license; and that 
defendant financed the construction of the grain elevator 
through a loan from the Commodity Credit Corporation with 
the understanding that such loans were allowed only for the 
purpose of erecting storage facilities for the farmer's own pro-
duce, and not for commercial or other purposes. Under these 
circumstances, plaintiff distinguishes this case from Machinery 
Engineering Co. v. Nickel, 101 Cal.App.2d 748 [226 P.2d 78], 
where a hay processing mill "[a]dmittedly ... was not to be 
connected with any particular farm as a part thereof, or used 
in connection with any particular farm'' but was ''intended 
to be a commercial enterprise ... to grind the hay of farmers 
generally, located in the area" (pp. 751-752); and from Cali-
fornia Emp. Corn. v. Bntte County etc. Assn., 25 Cal.2d 624 
[154 P.2d 892], where a warehouse was owned by an incorpo-
rated cooperative association, the storage facilities were avail-
able alike to both members and nonmembers, and the associa-
tion as so licensed was held "in essence a commercial enterprise 
-a profitable pnblic warehouse bnsiness" (p. 636). 
Plaintiff urges that since the construction of the grain ele-
'l'RESCONY [48 C.2<l 
vat or was primarily for· the purpose of storage of defendant's 
own produce, and defendant only contemplated the rental of 
exeess storage space in an effort to operate his overall farming 
rnterprise at maximum efficieney, the limited rental use wonld 
not reasonably constitute the grain elevator a eommcreial 
operation nor deprive it of its fundamental eharaeter as a 
~-;tructure ineiclcntal to defendant's own farming. However, 
the merits of plaintiff's argnment ou this point need not he 
here decided, for the record elcarly supports the finding that 
the grain elevator was not "located on a farm" as required 
for applieation of the exemption. (Fmenkcl v. Bank of Amer-
ica. SII[Jra, 40 Cal.2d 845, 850.) 
Admittedly, the grain elevator was creeted on a town site, 
whieh was approximately 31/z miles distant from defendant's 
farm, and the only access between the two plaees ~was by a 
pnblic road. The site was adjaeeut to the main railroad lim•s 
servieing the tovm; other nearby property was industrial or 
commercial in eharaeter rather than agrieultnral; and specifi-
eally, the parcel of land adjoining defendant's town property 
was oeeupied by a commen:ially operated grain elevator for 
the usc of neighboring farmers. [2] A farm is generally 
defined ''as a traet of land used for raising erops or rearing 
animals--one devoted to agriculture, stoek raising or some 
allied industry.'' (Board of Supervisors v. Cothran, 84 Cal. 
App.2(l 679, 682 [191 P.2d 506] ; see also Jlagenburger v. City 
of Los Angeles, 51 Cal.App.2c1 161, 164 [124 P.2d 345] .) 
[3] It is true that in keeping with modern methods and acl-
nlnecment in mechanized operations, present-day farming ma.v 
enl'Olll pass the use of multiple scattered tracts rather than a 
:-;ingle pareel of land, and the requirements for the efficient 
fmwtioning of a large farming enterprise cannot be measured 
in the light of farming (:onditions as they existed "a centnry 
or more ago." (Irvine Co. v. California Emp. Com., 27 Cal. 
2d 570, fi82 f Hi5 P .2rl 908].) But despite such ehanges in the 
JHYvailing eoueept of a farming enterprise, still a strnrturP 
'' loea t <'<l on a farm'' woulll reasonably envisage loeat ion on 
land devoted to agril'ultnre as eommouly nnderstood to mean 
<lll land used for "the raising of crops, or pasture, or both" 
(3;) C .• J.S. p. 74G) rathPr than loeation on property situated 
in a predmnimmtly iiHlnstrial or <'Ommereial sc,t'tor of a town 
sOllH' miks from the adnal fm·m on whid1 thl' c-rops are 
pro, lw·••d. 
[4] Plaintiff a1·gw•s tl1ni since ddeJHlallt was a farmer 
and the owm·r of a farm, and tlH' grain eleYator was designed 
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primarily for the own such grain 
elevator thereby beeame of defendant's farm and was thus 
''located on a farm." Sneh completely eliminates 
one of the two eoujundively required faetors of the farming 
exemption as construed in lhaenkel v. Bank of America, supra, 
40 Cal.2d 845, 849. B'rom the mere fact that the construction 
is designed primarily for the storage of a farmer's own farm 
produds, it does uot automatically follow that the construction 
is thereby "located on a farm." As was said in Fraenkel v. 
Bank of America, supra, at page 850, it is only ''if the grain 
elevator was built on defendant's farm and designed to func-
tion as an incidental part of his own farming operations ... 
[that] there would be a factual basis for holding such struc-
ture to be within the terms of the exemption as a 'construction 
or operation incidental to . . . farming.' '' (Emphasis 
added.) 
[5] To hold otherwise, and permit the farming exemption 
to apply to construction work which is not performed on a 
farm, would seem to run counter to the purposes of the 
contractor's licensing law enacted for the safety and protec-
tion of the public respecting structural improvements to real 
property wherein special skill, training and ability are re-
quired. (Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 609 [204 
P.2d 23]; llranklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal.2d 
628, 632 [204 P.2d 37].) [6] In exempting construction 
"incidental to farming" from the state licensing requirements, 
the Legislature manifestly did not intend to include every 
structure bearing a possible relation to the farming industry 
and without regard for its location in relation to the farm. It 
therefore seems clear that the exemption should not be ex-
tended to office buildings, warehouses, grain elevators or simi-
lar structures constructed at sites far removed from the farm, 
and perhaps in the center of cities or towns, even though such 
facilities might be constructed for the sole use of a single 
farmer in connection with his own extensive farming opera-
tions. Rather, it is only where the particular structure is 
"located on a farm" and "designed to function as an inci-
dental part" of the farmer's own farming operations (]i1raen-
lcel v. Bank of America, supra, 40 Cal.2d 845, 850) that such 
structure thereby reasonably becomes "dissociated from the 
objects and purposes of the licensing law" (ibicl., p. 849) and 
the farming exemption applies. Here the trial court found 
from the evidence that the grain elevator was not constructed 
''on a farm,'' and accordingly plaintiff, as an unlicensed con-
384 FRAENKEL V. TRESCONY [48 C.2d 
tl'ador, ~was properly held to be precluded from maintaining 
the present action. 
'rhe ju(tgment is afiirmed. 
Gibson, C. J ., Traynor, J~., and McComb, J., concurred. 
SCHA UETI, J., Dissenting.-In my view the majority opin-
ion errs egregiously in holding, implicitly, that the defendant 
by his own act, in concert with a third person, subseqnent to 
the execution of the contract with plain.tiff, may retroactively 
remler plaintiff's contract with defendant unlawful, and may 
then invoke his own wrong to defeat plaintiff's right of 
recovery after the latter's faithful performance of the con-
tract. Such contract, on any reasonable view of the evidence, 
appears to me to have been lawful when made, lawful in 
object, and lmYful in performance. 'l'he only possibly unlaw-
ful dealing in connection ~with it appears to have been defend-
ant's conduct in renting to third persons a portion of the 
completed elevator storage space and thereby and to that 
extent apparently engaging in a commercial rather than a 
strictly farming activity. The principal question argued on 
appeal is ·whether the work called for by the contract comes 
within the fanning exemption created by Business and Pro-
fessions Code, section 7049, hereinafter quoted. 
For a clear comprrhension of the legal problem involved, 
the salient facts of the controversy should be borne in mind. 
At all times concerned plaintiff has been a ''registered pro-
fessional engineer,'' skilled in the design and construction of 
grain elevators, but not "licensed as a contractor." Defend-
ant is engaged in farming some 5,000 acres of land. Plaintiff 
contracted with defendant to ''prepare plans, blueprints and 
specifications for a grain elevator and storage facility of an 
approximate capacity of 800 tons of barley," to "sub-contract 
for the customer'' certain specified work, to ''furnish all ma-
chinery, equipment and materials,'' and to ''inspect and 
supervise all \York performed by others and to furnish a 
superintendent." The basis of plaintiff's compensation was 
to be "cost plus ten per cent." It is conceded (at this stage 
of the litigation) that the terms of the contract bring plaintiff 
within the definition of a contractor as that term is defined 
in Business and Professions Code, section 7026, hereinafter 
quoted. Sueh concession does not, however, establish that 
the contract \Yas either unlawful or unenforcible, as will be 
hereinafter shown. 
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It is to be emphasized that the controlling issue before us is 
not whether after completion of the structure defendant may 
have put it to some unlawful use but is whether the contract 
upon which plaintiff sues was lawful when executed. 
The elevator was constructed on land owned by defendant 
where it would be most efficient in defendant's farming oper-
ations; i.e., where it would not use up arable land of the main 
agricultural tract and where it would be adjacent to a rail-
road so that the marketing of defendant's farm produce would 
involve a minimum of handling. That the railroad's tracks 
and nearest station happen to lie some 3% miles from the 
land on which defendant's grain is grown does not appear 
to me to be important. The important thing to the farming 
operation is that the elevator be adjacent to the railroad 
tracks and station. So located, the farm produce as harvested 
could be picked up and transported directly to the elevator 
for temporary storage and direct loading from it onto railroad 
cars. The tonnage capacity for the elevator was determined 
from defendant's acreage and past harvests. That fact, as 
will appear from the law hereinafter developed, is consistent 
with-and only with-an intention by plaintiff to use his 
engineering and construction skills lawfully in contracting 
with defendant to build an elevator to be used by defendant 
in his farming operation. 
It is not disputed that the primary purpose of building 
the elevator >Yas the efficient marketing (temporary storage 
and loading for shipment) of defendant's farm produce. We 
may infer that defendant, intending to operate for the greatest 
possible profit and to that end to pare losses in bad crop 
years, had in mind also that, when his own crop was short, 
he might derive some benefit himself-and possibly confer 
some on neighbors-by renting surplus space. In actual use 
it appears that the first year's storage consisted of 800 
tons of defendant's grain and 200 tons on rental ; the next 
year defendant required space for 700 tons and found rental 
for 300 tons. But in my view the use to which defendant put 
the elevator after its construction (as well as any secret 
intention he may have harbored upon entering into the con-
tract) is wholly immaterial in this litigation between plaintiff 
and defendant. There is no showing that plaintiff in entering 
into the contract with defendant had guilty knowledge of the 
latter's unlawful intentions, if he then had any, as to use of 
the completed structure. 
This litigation is in itself strong evidence of defendant's 
48 C.2d-13 
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alertness and willingness to the end of tnrniug a tidy penny. 
'rhe triat court found that the eoutrad prier of construdion 
was $21,2;38.93; that dneing the r:omse of construction cle-
frnt1ant paid vlaintiff $8,97D.94, but has refused to pay any 
part of thr balance. Defendant argues in support of his 
refusal to pay--and the majority give his legal position their 
judicial blessing-that the elevator is not located on defend-
ant's farm, that since its construction defendant has used 
it in some part for commercial rental as well as for hi» own 
farming operations, that plaintiff is licensed only as a "pro-
fessional engineer,'' that he does not possess a building con-
trm•tor 's license, and that therefore under certain provisions 
of the Dnsiness and Professions Code plaintiff cannot require 
defendant to pay for ·what he received. 
The pertinent provisions of the Business and Professions 
Code are as follows : 
Section 7026 defines "contractor" as "any person who 
undertakes to . . . construct . . . any building . . . or other 
improvement ... or other structures ... '' 
Sedion 7028 provides that "It ic; unlawful for any person 
to engage in the business or act in the capacity of a contractor 
within this State ·without having a license therefor, unless 
snch person is partic1tlarly exempted from the provisions of 
tlt1·s chapter." (Italics added.) 
Seetion 7031 pnwides that "No person engaged in the 
business ... of a contractor, may bring or maintain any 
action in any court of this State for the collection of compen-
sation for the performance of any act or contract for which a 
license is required by this chapter without alleging and 
peoving that he was a duly lice11scd contractor at all times 
during the performance of such act or contract." 
Section 7049, how eYer, provides that "This chapter [which 
contains the last qnotcd sections] does not apply to any con-
struction or operation incidental to ... farming, dairying, 
agriculture, viticulture, horticulture ... except \vhen per-
formed by a lieensre under this chapter." Furthermore, 
section 7050 provicles that the chapter "docs not apply to an 
owner who contracts for a project ·with a licensed eontractor 
or eontraetors" (sec also § 7030) and section 7051 declares 
that such chapter ''does not apply to a licensed architect or 
a registered ciYil or professional engineer acting solely in 
his professional capacity . " The majority expressed the 
view (ill F'racnkcl v. Bank of AmcTica (] 9;)3), 40 Cal.2d 845, 
848 [1] [256 P.2d 56D]) that sedion 7049 exempts "any 
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construction or operation incidental to . farming ... 
agriculture" but they now take the position that the marketing 
of farm produce is not an incident of farming insofar as it 
entails the use of a grain elevator which is not located on 
the parcel of land on which the grain is grown. More spe-
cifically, the majority say that plaintiff's other arguments 
"need not be here decided, for the record clearly supports 
the finding that the grain elevator was not 'located on a 
farm' as required for application of the exemption." 
Regardless of the applicability of the other quoted sections 
dealing with exemptions, it is my view that farming includes 
marketing the produce of the farm, that a farmer should not 
be penalized for operating efficiently, and that neither should 
he be permitted-unless the law is altogether clear and com-
pulsory to that end-to invoke the contractors' license law 
in such a situation as this in order to achieve unjust enrich-
ment. His defense here is an affirmative defense; he invokes 
the statute to defeat what otherwise appears to be a just and 
enforcible claim. Section 7050, hereinabove quoted, suggests 
that if plaintiff has violated the law by entering into the 
contract then so also has defendant, for defendant entered into 
the construction contract with plaintiff, a non-licensed con-
tractor. If defendant at the time of contracting for plaintiff's 
services intended that the construction should serve any pur-
pose other than one legitimately incidental to his farming 
operation he violated the law. Is he taking the position now 
that he confided such intention to plaintiff and conspired with 
him to commit a crime~ How else can he prevail in his 
defense? 
If we construe the law fairly, and particularly if we give 
any weight whatsoever to the presumption of innocence and 
the rule of construction against extending a statute in order to 
find guilt of crime (People v. Valentine (1946), 28 Cal.2d 121, 
143 [20] [169 P.2d 1]; People v. Srnith (1955), 44 Cal.2d 
77, 79 [2] [3] [279 P.2d 33], we should conclude that neither 
plaintiff nor defendant was guilty of a crime in entering into 
the contract. Section 7049, above quoted, does not require 
that the "construction or operation" which is the subject 
of exemption be conducted on land which is part of, or con-
tiguous to, the parcel on which the crop is grown. The 
exemption rather, by its express terms is inclusive of "any con-
struction or operation incidental to ... farmin(J, dairying 
agricult1.trc, viticulture, horticulture ... " (Italics added.) 
The intention of the Legislature to grant a broad exemption 
FRAENKEL V. TRESCONY [48 C.2t1 
extending throughout the area of farming and its incidental 
operations appears clear. (See Kelly v. Hill (1951), 104 Cal. 
App.2d 61, 65 [230 P.2d 864].) The word "agriculture," 
in its commonly accepted meaning, includes not only ''the 
production of plants and animals useful to man [but also] 
... to a variable extent the preparation of those products 
for man's use and their disposal by marketing ... " CW eb-
ster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition.) It 
seems to me that the grain elevator, located exactly 'Where 
it is, is part and parcel of defendant's farming operation. 
At least there is no evidence sufficient to establish that plain-
tiff, in entering into the contraet with defendant, had knowl-
edge or notice that the eontemplated construction ·was other 
than incidental to defendant's farming operation. The ele-
vator is not a part of the main farm crop growing area, hut 
eertainly it is a part of the farm in the same sense that 
harvesting the crop, collecting it, storing it and marketing 
it are a part of and ineidental to farming. Surely the fart 
that defendant, after performanee of the contraet by plaintiff, 
rented some of the storage space in the elevator to third 
persons should not be eonsidered as against plaintiff. 
For the reasons above stated, I would reverse the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I coneur in the views expressed in the dissenting opm10n 
of Mr. Justiee Schauer and for the reasons there stated and 
also for the reasons stated in my eoneurring opinion in 
Fraenkel v. Bank of America, 40 Cal.2d 845 at page 851 [256 
P.2d 569], I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 15, 
1957. Shenk, ,J., Carter, ,J., and Sehauer, ,J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
